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1. INTRODUCTION
Inan earlier paper (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974a) we presented
preliminary estimates of the price and income elasticities for
various medical care services, including hospital length of stay,
hospital room and board price, physician visits, and physician
price. The theory on which these estimates were based was derived
from the work of Grossman (1972) and one of the authors (Phelps,
1973). The estimates were made from data collected in the 1963
Center for Health Administration Studies Survey (Andersen and
Anderson, 1967). Our sample was limited to heads who were
employed, because these individuals were assumed to have well-
defined values of time. In this paper we extend our earlier work,
using the same data source. The extension includes reestimating
The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Ronald Andersen in making the data used in this
study available to them and helpful comments and computation assistance by David Weinschrott
and Sharon Yamasaki.
The research reported herein was performed in part pursuant to a grant from the Office of
Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C. This project was also supported in part by Grant No.
HS-00840-O1 from the National Center for Health Services Research and Development. The
opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors, and should not be
construed as representing the opinions or policy of any agency of the United States government.
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JL.the earlier equations on a larger, more diverse sample, plus estimat- TheDepende
ingthe determinants of use or nonuse of medical services.
We first briefly recapitulate the specification we are using. We In this pape
then consider the question of estimating a value of time for those length of st
not employed in order to include such individuals in our sample. board price
Unfortunately, computational problems have prevented us from variation in
estimating the value of time in an appropriate fashion, and there- include all c
fore our estimates of demand curves based on the larger sample that this omissio
includes individuals not employed must be treated as preliminary. Hospital
But the estimates based on the larger sample are consistent with day. Patien
and support our estimates using the smaller sample of employed determinant
heads. determinant
In the earlier paper our estimates of demand were conditional on average oft]
some use of the medical care system—for example, length of stay in per day, wi
a hospital, conditional on admission. In this paper we consider, in services in I
addition,the question of use or nonuse of hospital and office approximat€
services. Thus, we estimate an admissions equation for hospital 1968). In Se
services and its analogue for physician services. Some theoretical board price
complications of estimating these demand curves are discussed and hospital exi
estimates of the price elasticity are presented. With these estimates assumption
we are in a position to compute the elasticity of medical care assume that
expenditure with respect to price and income. In an appendix we does.
present revised estimates based on the smaller sample used in our We also e
earlier paper. These estimates correct some computational errors; of equation:








This section reviews the specification used in Newhouse and type of acco
Phelps (1974a); this will also be the basic specification used in this by the avel
paper. Our specification is a generalization of Michael Grossman's seen (genet
investment model (Grossman, 1972). The significant generalizations equation is
include: (1) disaggregation of medical services, so that medical given the ty
services are not considered a homogeneous commodity; (2) treat- tion is that
ment of insurance as endogenous; (3) permitting price to vary or type of p
among providers and treating the price of the provider selected as Multiplicati
endogenous. For a more complete discussion the reader is referred assumed to
to the earlier paper (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974a). We begin with holding prc
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Inthis paper we explain variation in hospital admissions, hospital
length of stay conditional on admission, and hospital room and
board price per day conditional on admission. We do not explain
variation in hospital ancillary services, so our estimates do not
include all components of hospital expenditure.' The importance of
this omission can be seen by disaggregating hospital expenditure.
Hospital expenditure is the product of patient days and price per
day. Patient days is the product of the admission rate, whose
determinants are discussed in Section 3, and length of stay, whose
determinants are discussed in Section 4. Price per day is a weighted
average of the room and board price and ancillary services in price
per day, with the shares of room and board price and ancillary
services in total price per day as weights. These shares each equal
approximately one-half (Health Insurance Association of America,
1968). In Section 4, we also explore determinants of the room and
board price. To derive estimates of the responsiveness of total
hospital expenditure to exogenous variables, one must make an
assumption about the responsiveness of ancillary services; we
assume that they respond the same way that room and board price
does.
We also explain use of the ambulatory services with a similar set
of equations (use of any ambulatory visits, number of visits condi-
tional on positive visits, and price per visit conditional on positive
visits). Unlike the case of hospital services, our estimates of price
per visit include ancillary services received per visit.
In this and in the earlier paper, hospital length of stay (nonobstet-
neal days) is weighted by the average price across the sample for
the type of accommodation (one, two, and three or more bed
medical or surgical accommodations); the room and board price
equation is estimated as a deviation from the average price for the
type of accommodation used. Similarly, physician visits are weighted
by the average price across the sample for the type of provider
seen (general practitioner or specialist); the physician visit price
equation is a deviation from the average price across the sample,
given the type of provider used. The rationale for this disaggrega-
tion is that variation in average price across type of accommodation
or type of provider is assumed to reflect productivity differences.
Multiplication of physical units by the average price is therefore
assumed to convert utilization to efficiency units. Variation of price
holding provider type constant is assumed to reflect amenities,
shorter queues, or incomplete search. Our estimates of expenditure







In the length of stay and physician visit equations, this variable regard to co
represents the price paid for a marginal unit (net of insurance visit equati
benefits) measured in dollars. The theory underlying either an
f
cross-price
investment model (Grossman, 1972) or a consumption model utilization
(Grossman, 1972; Phelps, 1973) specifies marginal price in the In the ad
first-order conditions; excluding the Giffen good case, a negative tion, we do
sign is expected. However, the theory assumes that price per unit is explanatory
constant, and this assumption is violated if a deductible is present in Section
in the policy; price per unit then falls with expenditure. In this average of
case, the true price of the price the consumer acts on when below physician c
the deductible is less than the observable price, because a unit of
consumption raises the probability of later exceeding the deducti-
ble (Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps, 1974). Because the true margi- Cross-Price
nalprice cannot be observed, we have excluded individuals with
deductibles in their policies, except where otherwise noted. There In the lengt
are other examples of variation in unit price as total expenditure as the net p
varies (such as an upper limit); however, we do not regard these as the
empirically important.2 hospital roo
Because sicker individuals tend to purchase better insurance predicted s
(Phelps, 1973), net price is treated as an endogenous variable. Our complemen
excluded exogenous variables are size of work group (an instru- an expendi
ment for insurance price) and nine occupation dummy variables.3 and visit eç
In the equations explaining deviation from the average price, the In the us
own-price variable is the coinsurance rate at the margin. In the case
of hospital policies it was necessary to account for the policies that
pay up to a certain dollar amount per day and nothing thereafter; in
this case, the dollar amount of the limit was entered if the policy WageRate
wasof that type (zero otherwise). In addition, we entered a dummy
variable that took the value of 1 if the policy did not have a dollar This is me
limit so that the intercept could also adjust for this type of policy, because a'
These variables are all endogenous. In the price equations (but not data. Thus,
the utilization equations) we have excluded individuals who sought reallocatioi
care for which there was no charge made by the provider, either for week if the
reasons of charity or professional courtesy. This amounted to some (summing
10 to 15 per cent of the sample. Such individuals were of necessity investment
excluded because there is no gross price variable for them. sumption fl
Becausewe use the actual marginal price (the marginal coinsur- Two corn
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ance rate times the gross price) in the length of stay and visit
equations, and because the gross price is a function of the coinsur-
ance rate, we cannot simply add the estimated "utilization" and
"price" elasticities to derive an expenditure elasticity with respect
to coinsurance. To do so would involve some amount of double
counting. In order to derive the elasticity of expenditure with
regard to coinsurance, we have reestimated the. length of stay and
visit equations with just the coinsurance rates as the own-price and
cross-price variables and have used the resulting elasticity of
utilization with respect to coinsurance in our concluding section.
In the admission equation and use-nonuse of office visits equa-
tion, we do not use marginal price but, rather, coinsurance rates as
explanatory variables. The rationale for this approach is explained
in Section 4. Also, the hospital coinsurance rate is a weighted
average of the room and board coinsurance rate and the inpatient
physician coinsurance rate. (See Section 4.)
Cross-Price
Inthe length of stay and visit equations, the cross-price is specified
as the net price paid for a marginal unit, measured in dollars. It is
the physician office visit price in the length of stay equation and the
hospital room and board price in the physician visit equation. The
predicted sign is ambiguous, depending on whether the good is a
complement or substitute. As in the case of own-price, to estimate
an expenditure elasticity we have reestimated the length of stay
and visit equations using only the coinsurance rate.
In the use-nonuse equations the cross-price is specified as the
coinsurance rate, for reasons explained in Section 4.
WageRate
Thisis measured in dollars per week (averaged over the year),
because a week is the shortest time period available in the 1963
data. Thus, we assume that labor force adjustments occur through
reallocation of weeks worked per year rather than hours worked per
week if the wage rate changes. The expected sign of the wage rate
(summing its effect over all medical services) is positive in the
investment model; the variable has no predicted sign in the con-
sumption model.
Two complications arise when testing this concept empirically. If
265 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Carethe health status variables do not adequately control for health Age
status,there will be a downward bias in the measured effect of
income, because poor health is often associated with negative Age is mea
transitory income. The second complication concerns sick leave be positive
and disability insurance provisions about which we have no data. rates are ft
To the extent that such provisions improve with wage income, the no effect.
measured effect of income is positively biased.4 The net effect of
these two complications on our estimates cannot be known with





This is measured in dollars per year. There should be no relation- ences in ac
ship between nonwage income and demand in the investment different
model, and a positive relationship in the consumption model. The
hypothesis of no relationship is difficult to test because the theoret-
ical prediction relates to a lifetime, one-period model, and nonwage
income in any single year may be only weakly related to the present SeIf-Perceiv
valueof all nonwage income flows. If the error in measuring the
theoretical construct is random, both the coefficient and the t These are
statistic are inconsistent toward zero (Cooper and Newhouse, health stat
1971). to rise. Be
equations
FamilySize
This is the number of individuals in the family unit, which is
defined as the group of related individuals living together. Family These rati
size is expected to have a negative effect if nonwage income has a dence anc
positive effect, although it may also have an effect if nonwage medical d
income has no effect (Grossman, 1972). If neither family size nor munity de
nonwage income is significant, support for the investment model is overfull. I






Education is measured by the highest grade completed. The effect these data
is expected to be negative in the investment model (Grossman, exist if the
1972); the consumption model yields no simple prediction on the of geograp
sign. are
266 Newhouse and Phelps 267 PriAge
Ageis measured in years; the effect on consumption is expected to
be positive if the depreciation rate rises with age. If depreciation
rates are fully captured in health status variables, age should have
no effect.
Sexand Race
Theseare dummy variables that take the value of 1 for females and
nonwhites. They are included to standardize for possible underly-
ing differences between the sexes in demand for care and differ-
ences in access (especially travel costs) that may confront persons of
different races.
Self-PerceivedHealth Status and Disability Days
Theseare included as a measure of health stock. As self-perceived
health status decreases and disability days rise, demand is expected
to rise. Because disability days may be endogenous, we estimated
equations with it omitted, and our results did not change.5
Beds-Populationand Physician-Population Ratios
Theseratios refer to the medical resources in the county of resi-
dence and are included to account for the stochastic nature of
medical demand. The greater community supply is relative to com-
munity demand, the smaller proportion of the time will facilities be
overfull. Although we have measures of community supply, we
have no measure of community demand. Because of the likely
positive covariance between community supply and demand, the
coefficient of the supply variable is biased toward zero as a gauge of
the behavior we seek to measure.
Notice that the problem of simultaneity that exists when equa-
tions are estimated from aggregate data is not necessarily present in
these data on the demand of individuals. In particular, it will not
exist if the error term for the individual is distributed independent
of geography (that is, the omitted variables and measurement error
are independent of geography).
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redictjon on thej Region 1 nonemplo)
(1974). (Se
Four regional dummies are included in the price equations to offered
standardize for differences in nominal prices among regions. The
Pacific region is the omitted region. (1) Wf(ed
and a
(2) =f (F RuralPlace of Residence
Thisdummy takes the value of 1 if the place of residence is rural Furtherm(
and is intended to standardize for differences in travel time and
other demographic characteristics between rural and urban areas. (3) hours (i
Ifw>t
positive h
FunctionalForm, Estimators, and Data Summary womanwi
equation I
Wehave entered the variables in a simple linear form. For some value the variables (price, nonwage income) we have tested a quadratic form;
this has not resulted in any improvement. We present estimates equation v using both two-stage least squares (TSLS) and ordinary least and e to b squares (OLS).6 Summary statistics are presented in Appendix 1, Heckman




3.DEMANDFORCARE FROM INDIVIDUALS laborfore
WHOARE NOT EMPLOYED estimate
Addingindividuals who are not employed to our sample has two force and
helpful effects. First, it considerably increases the size of the labor forci
sample available for estimation, thereby improving the precision of time.'°
our estimates. Second, the employed population greatly underrep- A priori
resents individuals who are not prime-age males. If there are down;
interactions between sex (and age) and price elasticities, estimates because u
labor fore that do not account for such interactions could be quite inaccurate.
But if there are few non-prime-age males in the sample, itis at nonmar
difficult to test for interactions. will d
The major problem to be solved before individuals who are not Gronai
employed can be included is estimating an opportunity cost of time introduce
for them. For those who are employed, we have followed the tics, such
conventional practice of assuming that a wage rate (dollars per by OLS i
week in our case) measured this opportunity cost.7 Obviously, for demand e
individuals who are not employed, a wage rate is not available, and the ci
biased. I The most significant work on estimating the value of time for
288
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lue of time for
nonemployed individuals has been done by James Heckman
(1974). (See also Gronau, 1973a, 1973b.) Heckman postulated an
offered wage function for housewives:
(1) w =f (education, experience) + e
and a wage-asking function:
(2) =f (hours, number of children under 6, spouses' wage, education,
net assets) + u
Furthermore, for women free to choose their working hours
(3) hours.(tvw*)=0
If w when hours equal 0, then the woman will work
positive hours until w when hours equal 0, the
woman will not work (that is, hours are 0). It is the wage-asking
equation that is relevant for our purposes, because it yields the
value the nonworking woman places on her time.
Heckman estimates equations (1) and (2) with a simultaneous
equation version of tobit (Tobin, 1958), allowing the covariance oft,
and e to be non-zero.8 The estimator is a nonlinear estimator, and
Heckman uses a maximum likelihood routine.
We attempted to use Heckman's procedure, but computational
difficulties arose." We therefore resorted to a procedure known to
be biased—estimating a wage for those in the labor force and using
the resulting equation to estimate values of time for those not in the
labor force by setting weeks worked equal to zero. Thus, we
estimate (2) using OLS separately for men and women in the labor
force and then apply the resulting equations to those not in the
labor force, setting the weeks variable to zero to obtain a value of
time.
A priori, one cannot say whether this procedure is biased up or
down; this reflects ignorance of whether the person does not work
beèause w is "low" (for some reason the person is not suited to the
labor force) or because w" is "high" (the person is very productive
at nonmarket work). The direction of bias, if any, in our estimate of
will depend on which reason predominates. Based on the work
of Gronau (1973a), there is some reason to believe that the bias
introduced is substantial and varies with demographic characteris-
tics, such as age, education, and race. Therefore, if theestimated
by OLS is applied to the nonworking subsample and used in a
demand equation, the coefficient of w' will be biased toward zero,
and the coefficients of the demographic characteristics will also be
biased. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the price
I
269 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical CareI
elasticityis biased. Our estimates using the subsample of employed under uncet
heads suggest that any bias in the price elasticity is likely to be if the expect
small. if
To estimate w" we used the specification described in (2) (4) V=5 U(x (substituting weeks for hours because that was the measure of labor
supply in the 1963 survey) and added two health variables (self- where U is
perceived health status and disability days), dummy variables for utility is cot
"don't know" or "not applicable" responses, and used nonwage the expectei
income rather than net assets. The resulting estimates are shown in the
Appendix 1, Table 2." Because these equations are used merely to tion of other
produce an estimated wage and because the procedure is known to The chan










Amajor theoretical question to be faced in estimating an equation that deman
predicting the probability of admission to a hospital is the specifica- from hospil
tiort of the price variable. The issue arises because there is typically (and perhap
some uncertainty about the out-of-pocket price the consumer will of these val
have to pay when the physician and the patient contemplate stock loss a
admission to the hospital. The problem may be formulated as advantage o
follows. Assume that there is a distribution of possible out-of- health stoc
pocket expenditures resulting from an admission. Assume that the Because ix
parameters of this distribution depend on the health stock loss and insurance, I
insurancepolicy of the consumer, so that the distribution can be anything. F
written as f(x;L,I) where f is a density function of expenditures insurance v
measured in terms of other goods x that can be bought after paying Health st
for medical care. The density function is conditional on the health both the ex
stockloss L and the insurance policy I. There is also some for sorneon
probability distribution of final health status H after the hospital minor tUne
stay, because neither the physician nor the consumer knows what variation in
the outcome of the hospital stay will be. Let this distribution (the.
. notwilling
benefit) have a density function g(H;L); this function is also affect the i
conditional on the health stock loss. may well b
The admission decision is discrete; the patient is either admitted It is theref
or not admitted. Under standard assumptions concerning behavior general m(
270 Newhouse and Phe'ps 271 Pricof employed
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under uncertainty, the physician and the patient choose admission




where U is a utility function in other goods, x, and health status, H;
utility is conditional on the loss. In this expression the first term is
the expected benefit, conditional on the loss, and the second term is
the expected cost, in terms of utility lost from foregoing consump-
tion of other goods, conditional on the loss and the insurance plan.
The change this formulation makes from the standard model is
that uncertainty about price is explicitly introduced. The uncer-
tainty occurs because the consumer is not given a price per unit and
asked how many units he wants, but rather an uncertain price for an
entire stay (depending on length, tests ordered, etc.) and asked
whether he wants exactly one unit (one admission). Deriving the
theoretical properties of introducing uncertainty about the price is
not important for the purpose of this paper; we point out, however,
that for risk-averse consumers the introduction of uncertainty
decreases the probability of admission (relative to the certainty case
at the same expected price).'2
What is significant for present purposes about the above model is
that demand for admissions is a function of the expected benefits
from hospitalization and the expected out-of-pocket expenditure
(and perhaps higher moments of the distributions as well). Neither
of these values is observable, but they are functions of the health
stock loss and the insurance policy. Our basic strategy is to take
advantage of this dependence and enter variables that approximate
health stock loss and key parameters of the insurance policy.
Because policymaking interest centers around the response to
insurance, this deviation from the theoretical model loses little, if
anything. However, measurement of the health stock loss and the
insurance variable is not straightforward.
Health stock loss is not directly observable, yet it is obvious that
both the expected benefits and expected costs are typically greater
for someone with a severe or life-threatening illness than for a
minor illness. It would be a heroic assumption to assume that the
variation in L causes no change in V (i.e., that =0).If one is
not willing to make this assumption, variation in L will in general
affect the probability of hospitalization. Indeed, health stock loss
may well be the most important variable in explaining admissions.
It is therefore necessary to approximate L, and we have included a
general measure of self-perceived health status for this purpose.
271
IPrice and Income Elasticities of Medical CareThis is obviously an imperfect measure, but should serve as a price) is an i
reasonable first approximation. Moreover, the errors in measuring demand to
the effect of health stock loss are likely to be random and therefore responsiven
should not cause estimates of the effect of insurance to be incon- response to
sistent. The resul
The difficulties in measuring the insurance variable are largely variable is t
caused by the presence of deductibles.'3 This can be seen by purposes th
writing down the expression for expected out-of-pocket price, a ance rates f
natural variable to use in explaining demand: budget shai
weighted b
D inpatientI
(5) E(f(x)) =50xh(x)dr+C dered
estimate of
where h (x) is the distribution of gross expenditure (assumed given elasticity th
for the moment) and C and D are the coinsurance rate and the them.'8 The
deductible, respectively. If the deductible is zero, the first term is logit
obviously zero, so that the expected out-of-pocket costs are propor- sion, P, as
tional to the coinsurance rate. But if the deductible is positive, the function is:
expected out-of-pocket price is clearly not proportional to the
coinsurance rate.'4 Therefore we estimate the responsiveness of (6) P =1/(1+
hospitaladmissions to the coinsurance rate among those who have
no deductibles in their policies.'5 The advani
Additionally, in the admissions and use of physician equation we estimation
have used the coinsurance rate and not the expected price as an and one, th
explanatory variable. This is done for two reasons. First,itis be true. Th
difficult to define an expected price for the 92 per cent of the maximum I
sample who were not admitted to a hospital. Second, if the For dum
expenditure distribution h(x) were invariant with respect to C, the variable, an
result of estimating the response of admissions to C would be assumes th
equivalent to estimating the response of admissions to expected dummy va:
out-of-pocket price. Unfortunately, the assumption that h (x)is elasticity a'
independent of C is unwarranted; the results presented in Section 5 The
of this paper show that length of stay and choice of hospital respond own-coinsu
to C. This means that estimates of the responsiveness of admissions for hospita
to the expected out-of-pocket price will overestimate the respon- Z =2.99)a
siveness to changes in C, because a reduction in the coinsurance totic Z4.
rate (which would, ceteris pan bus, reduce out-of-pocket payments) be strongly
also introduces a partially offsetting rise in total expenditures with a with insura
consequent rise in expected out-of-pocket price (except in the deal of we
limiting case of full insurance).'6 However, policymaking interest very impol
centers around the responsiveness to insurance parameters because tional leve
that is what policy controls. Therefore, the overall response to likely toI
coinsurance (rather than the ceteris paribus response to expected variables ii
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price) is an important value to derive. To find the responsiveness of
demand to expected price, it is necessary to add estimates of the
responsiveness of the expenditure distribution to estimates of the
response to coinsurance.
The results of estimating an equation in which the explanatory
variable is the coinsurance rate are presented in Table 1. For these
purposes the coinsurance rate is a weighted average of the coinsur-
ance rates for hospital and inpatient physician expenditures, with
budget shares as weights (i.e., the hospital coinsurance rate was
weighted by hospital expenditure as a fraction of hospital plus
inpatient physician expenditures).'7 The coinsurance rate is consi-
dered exogenous in these results. Use of an instrumental variable
estimate of the coinsurance led to estimates of the own-price
elasticity that were further from zero; as a result, we do not present
them.'8 The results shown in Table 1 have been generated from a
logit regression. This procedure estimates the probability of admis-
sion, P, as a function of a vector of explanatory variables X; the
function is:
(6) P =11(1+ e
The advantage of this procedure relative to a simple least squares
estimation is that it constrains the probability to lie between zero
and one, thereby incorporating the prior information that this must
be true. This function is obviously nonlinear in f3; we have used a
maximum likelihood routine to estimate /3.19
Fordummy variables (sex, the health status variables, the rural
variable, and race) Table 1 shows the difference in P if the variable
assumes the value of 1 (continuous variables at their means, other
dummy variables at zero); for continuous variables we show the
elasticity at the mean of all variables.20
The results in Table 1 show a substantial response to both
own-coinsurance and cross-coinsurance; the elasticity at the mean
for hospital room and board coinsurance is—0.17 (asymptotic
Z =2.99)and for physician office visit coinsurance is —0.57 (asymp-
totic Z =4.82).Hospital and physician services therefore appear to
be strongly complementary, although there are so few individuals
with insurance for physician services that it is hard to place a great
deal of weight on this conclusion. Self-perceived health status is
very important; with it included, age is not significant at conven-
tional levels. Nonwhites are around 3.6 percentage points less
likely to be admitted to a hospital. Joint tests on the supply
variables indicate that they are not significant at the mean.
273 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Care




















































Variable Coefficient value) Variablesb
Hospital room and board rate
coinsurance —34 2.99 —.17
Physician office visit coinsurance — .71 4.82 — .57
Sex —.054 .45 —.005
Age .0006 .19 .018
Wage income .00002 .66 .023
Nonwage income .00007 2.87 .037
Health statusgood .76 5.56 .069
Health statusfair 1.39 7.73 .20
Health statuspoor 2.40 10.74 .66
Family size — .014 .45 — .058
Education —.019 1.82 —.10
Rural dummy — .030 .22 — .036
Physician-population .0028 .53 —.28
(Physician-population)2 — .000042 .97 —
Bed-population — .10 1.26 .41
(Bed-population)2 .020 2.69 —
Race —.63 3.16 —.036
Estimated value of time .0013 .75 .037
Constant —2.18 5.02 —
Chi-square of estimate (18 d.f.) =228.78 (p<0.Ol)
= 4,522. Thesample is arrived at by excluding: (a) 2,760 individuals whose policies were not verified;
(b) 38 individusls who have more than three insurance policies; this exclusion was for computational
reasons; (c) 7 individuals with wages higher than $500 per week in 1963; (d) 8 individuals who
exceeded $50 per visit for office visits; (e) 305 individuals with non-zero hospital deductibles; and
(1) 247 individuals with non-zero office visit deductibles. Some individuals are excluded for more than
one reason. The mean probability of admission is 0.078.
In computing elasticities, all variables are at their means. In computing the change in probability
induced by a change in the dummy variable, continuous variables are at their means and dummy.
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sown next to the linear
We have also estimated a use-nonuse equatiOn for the use of
physician office visits; the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if
there were any physician office visits. The underlying model is the
same as for hospital admissions, but the rationale for estimating a
separate "admissions" equation is somewhat different. In the case
øf hospital admissions, we emphasized the uncertainty surrounding
the price of an admission relative to the price of an extra day. This
uncertainty is not present to the same degree for office visits. But
there is a different rationale for estimating a separate visit equation
(rather than an equation that combines individuals with some visits
and individuals with no visits in an equation estimated by tobit
methods). The decision to seek any care from a physician is almost
always made solely by the consumer, with no information supplied
by the physician. Further visits may well incorporate information
from the physician, and this information may alter the responsive-
ness to the explanatory variables. In this case, combining informa-
tion on those having visits with those having none is inappropriate.
In our sample the probability of consulting a physician is 56
per cent—well below the estimate for the National Health Survey
of 70 per cent. This differenceisprobably attributableto
differences in definition; the CHAS survey does not include
telephone consultations in its definition of visits whereas the
National Health Survey does.
The CHAS 1963 sample is not optimal for estimating the respon-
siveness of demand for ambulatory physician services to price,
because 89 per cent of the sample does not carry insurance for
physician services. With that caveat we present our results for
use-nonuse of the physician in Table 2.
The own-coinsurance and cross-coinsurance elasticities are both
negative and highly significant, as in the case of hospital admis-
sions. Health statusis of considerable importance, asis race;
nonwhites have a lower probability of making any visits. The wage,
value of time, and nonwage income variables exhibit a small,
though significant, elasticity; family size has a significant and
negative effect. Notice that with self-perceived health status in the
equation, age has a negative effect on use. A joint test on the supply
variables shows that the physician-population ratio is significant at
the mean (asymptotic Z =1.99),but the bed-population ratio is not.
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5. AMOUNT OF MEDICAL CARE SERVICES In thelen
DEMANDED,CONDITIONAL ON SOME BEING is
DEMANDED .
InTable 3 we summarize the price and wage elasticities for the efficiency
amount of medical care services demanded, conditional on some are small
services being demanded. The complete equations can be found in The full
Table 3 of Appendix 1. All own-price elasticities estimated using the equati
OLS are small, but all are significantly different from zero. The positive a
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Variable Coefficient value) Variablesb
Physician office visit coinsurance —.28 2.60 —.11
Hospital coinsurance rate — .27 3.94 — .07
Sex .47 6.90 —.11
Age —.011 5.32 —.14
Wage income .000076 4.77 .044
Nonwage income .000043 2.34 .013
Health status good 4.19 .07
Health status fair .86 7.69 .21
Health status poor 1.41 8.41 .33
Family size —.12 7.15 —23
Education — .005 .85 — .013
Rural dummy .069 .84 —
Physician-population .0019 .67 .049
(Physician-population)2 .0000036 .30 —
Bed-population — .046 .92 .035
(Bed-population)2 .0063 1.28 —
Race —1.06 11.45 —.22
Estimated value of time .0053 4.75 .071
Constant .76 3.00 —
a n = 4,522.The sample is the same as in Table. 1. The mean probability of a visit is 0.56.
In computing elasticities, all variables are at their means. In computing the change in probability
induced by a change in the dummy variable, continuous variables are at their means and dummy


























sir means and dummy
is shown next to the
TABLE 3 Price and Wage Income Elasticitiesa









Hospital coinsurance x .08 . — .062 — .14 — .055
room arid board price (.43) (1.92) (.95) (2.95)
M.D. office visit coin- —23 .003 — .073 —.081
surance X visit price (.84) (.07) (.46) (4.65)






Nonwage income (less — .037 —.023 — .00008 — .004
than $3,000 per year) (.95) (.77) (.007) (.43)









Coinsurance rate of — .022 — .051 —.21 — .15
service (.49) (2.50) (1.01) (3.30)






Nonwage income (less .041 .022 .005 .009
than $3,000 per year) (2.12) (1.41) (1.47) (.94)
aThe absolutevalues of t statistics are in parentheses. Elasticities are computed at the mean.






can be found in
using
from zero. The
In the length of hospital stay OLS estimates, the own-price elastic-
ity is —0.062 (t =1.92).In the TSLS results, own-price is insignifi-
cant and positive; residual variance is around 30 per cent higher in
the TSLS estimates than in the OLS estimates, reflecting the lower
efficiency of that estimator. Wage and nonwage income elasticities
are small and insignificant.
The full equation is shown in Appendix 1, Table 3. Inspection of
the e'. tation reveals that nonwage income higher than $3,000 is
positiand significant in the OLS results, although with a small
277 Priceand Income Elasticities ofMedicalCareelasticity. This result is consistent with the consumption model, but are very
little should be made of it, because only 5 per cent of the sample the type
has a nonwage income higher than $3,000. A joint test on the supply significai
variables at their means shows them to be insignificant at conven- populati(
tional levels. The effect of race is to increase length of stay, the mean (t
opposite of the results found in the admissions equations (see Table specializ
1). Although the probability of admission for nonwhites is 3.6 concentr
percentage points less than for whites, their length of stay is 2.9 to mean, all
3.7 days higher, on average, than for whites. On net, the reduction in Table
of admissions more than offsets the increase in length of stay, so
that community-rated hospital insurance plans cause some racial
redistribution away from nonwhites; the expected number of
weighted patient days among nonwhites is some 20 per. cent lower PhysicianC
than among whites.2' In the p In these equations, if a person was employed during 1963, his elasticity actual wage rate was entered as an explanatory variable; otherwise, —0.07 (t the wage rate variable was zero. If a person was not employed, the the OLS
estimated time value is entered as a separate variable; this variable elasticity takes the value of zero if the individual is employed. Thus, we higher b permit the estimated response to the value of time to differ for the ticities ii employed and nonernployed, while constraining all other coeffi- consister
cients for the employed and nonemployed to be equal. If the wage complen
and the estimated value of time variables were added together, the small, as estimated coefficients would be constrained to be equal; we leave significa them separated to test that hypothesis. Although in general we play a r
cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal, we variables
have not shown results when we constrained the variables to have in the vi
the same coefficient because we felt that the wage variable was less
subject to measurement error and wanted a separate estimate of it. sign on
In any event, the estimates of price elasticity were hardly affected.
In the length of stay equations, both the wage and the estimated
. fraction
value of time show elasticities near zero and are not significantly higher




Theresponse of hospital price to coinsurance is small, but the
elasticity is quite significant in OLS. Based on the OLS result, a
. Physician F
changefrom no coverage to full coverage (other variables at their The resp
means) would increase the room and board price by approximately TSLS is
23 per cent.22 There is little response to wage or nonwage income, only sigi
We infer that neither amenities nor time saved from shorter queues
. resultm
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of the sample





of stay is 2.9 to
the reduction
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are very important in explaining the room and board price, given
the type of accommodation. Weighted hospital days is the most
significant variable in this equation. A joint test on the physician-
population ratio shows it is significant at the 5 per cent level at the
mean (t =2.2);we view thisresult asreflecting the more
specialized (and costly) facilities that exist where physicians are
concentrated.23 The bed-population ratio is not significant at its
mean, although its elasticity is negative. The full equation is shown
in Table 5 of Appendix 1.
PhysicianOffice Visits
Inthe physician office visit equation using OLS, the estimated
elasticity at the mean is —0.08 (t =4.65).The TSLS estimate is
—0.07 (t =0.46),so that one cannot determine if the significance of
the OLS estimate is due to adverse selection or not. The cross-price
elasticity is —0.06 and highly significant in OLS; it is somewhat
higher but not significant in TSLS. The negative cross-price elas-
ticities in the admissions and physician office visit equations are
consistent with the hypothesis that hospital and office services are
complements.24 The estimated elasticity for wage income is very
small, as are the elasticities for nonwage income. Family size is
significant and is negative, indicating consumption aspects may
play a role in physician utilization. Joint tests on the supply
variables indicate that they are very significant, but the elasticities
in the vicinity of the mean are very small—.03 for the physician-
population ratio and .002 for the bed-population ratio. The negative
sign on the coefficient of the (physician-population)2 variable
supports the hypothesis that additional physicians reduce the
fraction of time that demand exceeds• capacity. Visits are slightly
higher (0.6 visits more) for nonwhites (t=1.99in OLS), an
increase of 10 per cent above visits for whites, but this does not
offset the sharply lower probability of nonwhites using any ser-
vices.
PhysicianPrice
Theresponsiveness of physician price to coinsurance in OLS and
TSLS is —0.15 and —0.20, respectively, although the coefficient is
only significant in OLS. Thus, the apparent significance of the
result may be attributable to adverse selection. Using the OLS
279 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Careresult, an increase from no coverage to full coverage increases the The pr
price of the physician selected by 18 per cent.25 Wage income of health
elasticities are very significant, but small in both TSLS and OLS, wage anc
whereas nonwage income is not significant. This pattern supports 4; the co
the inference that a higher-priced physician represents less waiting The effe
time or less time devoted to search rather than additional amenities. insuranc
The quantity of physician office visits is significant in OLS but not higher w
TSLS; the OLS result supports the hypothesis that people who of respoi
make more visits search for lower-priced providers. physiciar
weighted
effects.
SeparateEquations for Those in and out of the
Labor Force
Weestimated results for the subsamples with positive wage income
and those with estimated values of time separately. In general, the 6.OVERA
OLSestimates of the important parameters were not very different REMAR
betweenthe two subsamples, although some of the TSLS parame-
ters did change. We performed the standard Chow test to determine In this se
if the two subsamples could be assumed to come from the same : lar servic
population; in some instances we could reject this hypothesis and
in others we could not. Because the greatest interest centers in the
estimates for the entire population (and for the sake of economy), TABLE4 I
wehave relegated the results for those with positive wage income
to Appendix 2 and have not presented the results for the subsample
withzero wage income.
Interaction Effects Wage
Wereestimated the length of stay and physician visit equations,
3 allowingthe price variable to interact with the following variables: 5000
healthstatus good or fair; health status poor (these variables io'ooo
permittedtesting whether those in worse health are more or less
sensitive to price); wage income; nonwage income; and price itself
(i.e., a quadratic term). In the length of stay equations, the addi-
tional interaction terms were uniformly insignificant. In the physi- Incom
clan visit equation, however, two of them (the interactions of price Wage
with poor health and nonwage income) were significant in the OLS
results; in addition, a joint test on all the interaction terms was 3,000
significant at the 1 per cent level in the OLS results. Those with 5,000
poor health have higher price elasticities (further from zero), 10,000
whereas those with high nonwage incomes exhibit lower elas- 'Individual assume
ticities. variables at means,

































The predicted number of visits from this equation for two levels
of health status, four coinsurance rates, and three combinations of
wage and nonwage income (on an annual basis) is shown in Table
4; the complete equations are shown in Table 4 of Appendix 1.
The effect of both interaction terms on responsiveness to co-
insurance appears small; visits appear some 10 to 15 per cent
higher with full insurance than with no insurance. This estimate
of responsiveness does not include the decision on use of the
physician at all, nor the effect of insurance on the price per
weighted visit. In the next section we attempt to combine these
effects.
6.OVERALL ESTIMATES AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
Inthis section we pull together our elasticity estimates for particu-
lar services and attempt to estimate overall coinsurance and wage
TABLE 4Physician Visits per Person for Various Levels of
Insurance, Income, and Health Status
Coinsurance
.5 .25 0 Wage
Income
Nonwage 1.0
3,000 0 4.75 5.01 5.13 5.26










Wage Nonwage 1.0 .5 .25 0
3,000 0 8.90 9.56 9.89 10.22
5,000 300 9.04 9.69 10.01 10.34
10,000 1000 9.40 10.01 10.32 10.63
* Individualassumed to be white, male, 45 years old, single, with a high school education. Other
variables at means, including gross price per visit.
281 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Careincome elasticities at the means of our data for hospital and
physician expenditures. The obvious imprecision and omissions in
our data make such an exercise hazardous, but the policy impor-
tance of the issue justifies even crude calculations.
Our most important problem in making such estimates is that
neither the OLS nor the TSLS estimates are ideal; the OLS
estimates of insurance elasticities are inconsistent away from zero,
if there is advance selection of insurance, but the TSLS estimates
are very imprecise and may in fact have larger mean square errors
than the OLS estimates. We have solved this problem by accepting
the OLS estimates but increasing their standard errors so that a 95
per cent confidence interval would include zero. There may be
some upward bias in our estimates as a result; the reader who is not
happy with this solution can easily construct similar estimates
using the TSLS results.
A second problem is that the results for length of stay and
physician visit equations use actual price. A change in the coinsur-
ance rate includes a partially offsetting rise in the gross price, as
shown by the price equations, and therefore use of an elasticity
with respect to the actual price would be expected to overstate the
elasticity with respect to the coinsurance rate. (See also the discus-
sion in Section 4.) We have therefore reestirnated the length of stay
and visit equations substituting the own- and cross-coinsurance rate
for the own- and cross-price. The resulting own-coinsurance elas-
ticities are summarized in Table 5, along with the wage and
nonwage income elasticities. The expected bias appears in the
length of stay results; however, in the physician office visit equa-
TABLE5 Estimates of Elasticity if Coinsurance Is Used












































































° Thetstatisticsare in parentheses.
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tion the coinsurance elasticity is further from zero than the marginal
price elasticity in Table 3. We attribute this result to sampling error.
The question then arises whether the results in Table 3 or Table
5 should be used; because policy interest primarily attaches to
changes in the coinsurance rate per Se, we have used those in Table
5. This means we add elasticities with respect to only the coinsur-
ance rate to arrive at an overall estimate.
A third problem was lack of information on the response of
hospital ancillary services to the coinsurance rate. We have as-
sumed that ancillary services, and therefore price per day, respond
to coinsurance in the same fashion as do room and board prices.
Modest differences in how ancillary services respond to coinsur-
ance will not substantially affect the, results. Finally, we have
assumed that the estimates are independent of one another for
purposes of calculating standard errors.
The values we used to make our calculations are shown in Table
6; they are taken from figures presented in tables 1, 2, 3, and 5.
These estimates yield an elasticity with respect to coinsurance of
—0.24 for hospital expenditure; this figure is shown in the line
entitled summary. A 95 per cent confidence interval is from —0.05













Admissionoruse-nonuse—.17 .085 —.11 .055
Length of stay or visits —.020 .040 —.16 .08
Price — .051 .0255 — .15 .075
Summary — .24 .097 — .42 .12
Wage income
Admission or use-nonuse .023 .034 .044 .0092
Length of stay or visits .044 .018 .015
Price . .010 .022 .075 .013
Summary .080 .060 .137 .022
Nonwage income
Admission or use-nonuse .037 .013 .013 .0056
Length of stay or visits — .029 .030 — .005 .010
Price .022 .016 .009 .0096
Summary .030 .036 .017 .015
283 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Careto —0.44.Theelasticity with respect to physician services is higher, Our estir
—0.42. A 95 per cent confidence interval is from —0.18 to —0.66. In ance are sc
appraising this estimate we would reemphasize that very few 1971; Davi
individuals in our sample had insurance for physician office visits, those estin
and therefore these figures should not be taken as a very reliable which
estimate of the effect of changes in coinsurance, upward dir
Table 6 also shows summary estimates of wage and nonwage somewhat
income elasticities. For hospital services the elasticity is 0.08, with mium data
a 95 per cent confidence interval from —0.04 to 0.20, and for premium d
physician services the elasticityis 0.137, with a 95 per cent ance, and t
confidence interval from 0.094 to 0.18. For nonwage income the with coinsi
elasticity for hospital services is 0.030, with a 95 per cent confi-
dence interval from —0.04 1 to 0.10 1, and for physician services it is from the ch
0.017, with a 95 per cent confidence interval from —0.012 to 0.046. than almos
From these services we can obtain an estimate of wage income Insurance
elasticities for hospital and physician services combined, using the no guarant
fact that 75 per cent of the expenditures on these two services Ambulator
combined are for hospital services (Cooper and Worthington, 1973). procedure
The resulting overall value is 0.094, with a 95 per cent confidence group (Mai
interval from 0.006 to 0.18. Because the confidence interval does the key
not include zero, this test supports Grossman's investment model. the margin
Adding nonwage income elasticities for each service in a similar variation i:
fashion (using the elasticities for nonwage income less than $3,000) example, s
yields a value of 0.027 as the elasticity, with a 95 per cent psychiatric
confidence interval from —0026 to +0.080. Because the confidence TSLS resul
interval does include zero, this result is also consistent with the elasticities
investment model. But as has been pointed out, nonwage income data.
for one year does not exactly correspond to the nonwage income Thus, th
concept of the model; therefore, we would caution against placing mates as w
much emphasis on this particular finding, appraising
A weak test of this result is the analogous overall elasticity for the effect of
family-size variable. For hospital services, family size is quite the margin
insignificant; the elasticity is —0.10, with a confidence interval light on th
from 0.173 to —0.383. For physician services, quite the opposite obvious ti
result obtains; the elasticity is —0.37 and highly significant, with a insurance
95 per cent confidence interval from —0.24 to —0.50. This is
consistent with a non-zero income effect; however, itisalso
possible to attribute the result to a complementarity between the
health stock of adults in a family and child-rearing activities
(Grossman, 1972). Across both hospital and physician services, the
imprecision of the results for hospital services dominates; the
combined elasticity with respect to family size is —0.17, with a 95
per cent confidence interval from 0.04 to —0.38.
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-0.17, with a 95
Our estimates of elasticities at the mean with respect to coinsur-
ance are somewhat lower than those in the literature (Feldstein,
1971; Davis-Russell, 1972). However, the data used to constmct
those estimates contain errors in measuring the price variable,
which cause the estimates to be inconsistent, most likely in an
upward direction (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974b). Our estimates are
somewhat higher than those we have made using insurance pre-
mium data (Phelps and Newhouse, 1974). But our insurance
premium data come from a substantially lower range of coinsur-
ance, and there is some evidence in those data that elasticity falls
with coinsurance.
Nevertheless, we would not exempt the data used in this paper
from the charge of errors in measurement. Although they are richer
than almost any other existing survey data, they are far from ideal.
Insurance coverage is measured at the end of the year, and there is
no guarantee that the insurance was in force throughout the year.
Ambulatory utilization was measured by recall over the year, a
procedure known to contain systematic biases by demographic
group (Marquis, Cannell, and Laurent, 1972). Although abstracting
the key features of the insurance policy and deriving the price of
the marginal unit has involved a very lengthy process, there is
variation in insurance policies that we have not measured. For
example, some policies might not cover a physical examination or
psychiatric procedures, whereas others might. Most important, the
TSLS results are almost never significant, so the possibility that all
elasticities are in fact zero cannot be dismissed on the basis of these
data.
Thus, these estimates are fragile. Moreover, our elasticity esti-
mates as well as those in the literature are really most helpful for
appraising the effect of variation in coinsurance. To estimate the
effect of varying a deductible is a more difficult problem because
the marginal price is not a constant, and these estimates shed little
light on the question of the effects of varying a deductible. It is
obvious that much remains to be learned about the effect of
insurance on consumer behavior.
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Nonwage income 328.08 651.17 1606
(0 if> $3,000)
Nonwage income 322.63 2151.91 2473
(0 ifthan $3,000)
Nonwage dummy 0.05 0.22 2473
(1 if nonwage in-
come> $3,000)
Wage income/week 31.70 60.97 1828
Value of time 33.82 35.88 789
Disability days 10.10 32.61 1169
Health status good 0.39 0.49 1596
Health status fair 0.13 0.34 2246
Health status poor 0.05 0.21 2473
Married 0.47 0.50 1389
Sex 0.55 0.50 1180
Race 0.086 0.28 2373
Family size 4.10 1.88 0
Age 25-34 0.13 0.33 2296
Age 35-54 0.24 0.43 1996
Age 55-64 0.081 0.27 2398
Age65 0.095 0.29 2328
Education 9-11 years 0.16 0.36 2207
Education 12 years 0.19 0.39 2137
Education 13-15 years 0.081 0.27 2415
Education16 years 0.059 0.24 2471
Physician-population 113.16 47.98 0







Weighted length of 7.39 7.49 0
stayb (n=364)
Hospital priceb (n=313) 47.75 S 26.19 0
Marginal hospital coin- 0.27 0.39 142
surance rate (n=313)
Weighted office 4.58 4.76 0
(n=2,617)
Office visit 7.12 6.43 0
(n= 2,346)
Marginal office visit 0.85 0.35 236
coinsurance rate
(n=2,346)
a Means andstandard deviations include zero values in wage and nonwage income variables. Means
and standard deviations are weighted to be representative of national sample by work-group size
and income.
weights are the normalized average prices for the type of service used (1,2,3 or more bed
surgical; 1,2,3 or more bed medical hospital room; general practitioners, specialist, or clinic). For
example, if a specialist visit cost $10 and the average physician visit price were $8, the specialist weight
was 1.25. The price variable is total expenditure divided by the weighted number of days or visits.




























































TABLE 1-2 Value of Time Equations—Dependent Variable
Wage Income per Week
Explanatory Variable
Males (n = 900)
Coefficient (t statistic)
Females (n = 527)
Coefficient (t statistic)
Weeks worked .54 .20
(2.43) (1.90)
Spouse's wage — .17
(3.18) (1.78)
Spouse dummy (=1 if no —25.68 —2.83
spouse) (2.00) (27)






Dummy =1if no nonwage 2128 928









Disability days .04 .22
(.42) (3.64)
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Recalculating Elasticities for Family Unit Heads
Inour earlier paper (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974a) we presented
results based on heads of households who had been hospitalized or
who used a physician. It later came to our attention that the data
included a number of heads who had no wage income during the
year. Our algorithm had assigned these individuals a zero wage and
hence a zero value of time, obviously an error. Therefore, we
reestimated these equations using the subset of heads with positive
wage income. In these revised estimates we excluded individuals
with deductibles in their policies for reasons explained in the text;
these individuals were included in the earlier results. We also
excluded from the price equations individuals who had obtained
care for which no charge had been made, which we had not done in
our earlier estimates. The results are sufficiently changed from
those in the earlier paper to warrant some discussion. In general,
the elasticities estimated using TSLS are near zero and not signifi-
cantly different from zero; the elasticities estimated using OLS are
rather small, but generally significant. We first consider hospital
admissions, then length of hospital stay, and then physician office
visits (nonsurgical). We did not estimate a use-nonuse of physicians
equation for the subsample of employed heads.
Hospital Admissions
The results (Table 2-1) show that the admissions response to
coinsurance among heads is very similar to the full sample; the
estimated elasticity is —0.21. Wage income is quite significant and
has an elasticity of 0.29, higher than 'in the full sample, whereas
nonwage income has practically no effect (elasticity of 0.04) and is
not significant at conventional levels. This finding tends to support
Grossman's investment model, although errors in measuring the
appropriate value of nonwage income make a strong conclusion
about its true value unjustified. However, the weakness of the
family-size effect also supports the investment model, and this
result is less easily attributed to errors in measurement. These
results must, however, be added with the results for length of stay
and hospital price to obtain an overall test of the investment model,
as is done in the text for the full sample.
Hospital beds in the county of residence were entered in linear
form in this table; unlike the full sample they exert a moderately
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TABLE 2-1LOGIT Estimation of Nonobstetrical Admission
Equation: No Positive Deductibles, Non-Zero
Wage Incomea
Absolute Value of








Variable Dummy Variables parentheses)
Hospital coinsurance rate —0.21 2.19 (.03)
Office visit coinsurance rate —0.40 2.26 (.02)
Sex (1 if female) 0.016 1.56 (.12)
Age 022 0.81 (.42)
Wage rate 029 2.16 (.03)
Nonwage income 0.036 1.25 (.26)
Health status good (1 if good) 0.050 3.59 (.01)
Health status fair (1 if fair) 0.074 3.62 (.01)
Health status poor (1 if poor) 0.30 6.44 (.01)
Family size —0,054 0.29 (.77)
Education —0.41 1.29 (.20)
Rural area dummy (1 if rural area) —0.007 0.76 (.45)
Physician-population —024 1.01 (.81)
Hospital bed-population 0.35 2.04 (.04)
Race (1 if nonwhite) —0.022 2.29 (.02)
Constant —2.33 —
Chi-square of estimate (15 d.f.) =83.6,significant at 0.01
n1,579.This is the sample remaining after excludingfrom the original sampleof7,803 individuals: (a)
2,760 individuals whose policies are not verified; (b) 38 individuals with more than three policies; this
exclusion was for computational convenience; (c) 3,244 individuals with zero wage income or wage
income in excess of $500 per week (1963 prices); and (d) 305 individuals with positive hospital or
medical deductibles. Some individuals are excluded for more than one reason. The mean probability of
admission is 0.077.
strong and statistically significant effect on hospital admissions. We
would expect this effect to be even more pronounced had we
included variables measuring community demand, as explained
above. Even as it stands, the result supports the notion that there is
nonprice rationing of hospital services (see also Rafferty, 1971).
This discrepancy from the full sample may be attributable to the
difference in functional form; we are continuing to explore this
question.
The health status dummy variables are the most important
determinants of admissions, as in the full sample. (Excellent health
299 PriceandIncome Elasticities o'f Medical CareS
status is the omitted value.) Controlling for health status, age does
not have a significant effect.'
Education has the negative effect predicted by the investment
model but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional
levels. The rural dummy variable is not significant.
In the results presented in Table 2-1 we excluded individuals
whose insurance policy contained a deductible. In order to take
account of variation in a deductible, as well as a coinsurance rate,
we have entered an expected total price variable directly. We are
not very confident about the results, however, because of the
difficulties of estimating the expected price. For those who did not
go to the hospital, we assumed that the mean gross price of those
who went was what was expected and applied the insurance policy
they had to this expenditure. For those who did go to the hospital,
we made two alternative assumptions: (1) that the expected expen-
diture was the actual realized expenditure, and (2) that the ex-
pected gross expenditure was the mean gross expenditure. We then
applied the insurance policy to determine the expected net expen-
diture. The former is probably the more realistic assumption,
because the physician and the individual usually have some infor-
mation about diagnosis when the patient is being admitted. For this
reason, the elasticity with respect to actual price could be expected
to be greater (in absolute value) than that estimated using the mean
price; those individuals who expected a low price would tend to be
admitted more readily, and vice versa. There is a second reason
why use of the actual price could be expected to result in a greater
elasticity than the mean price. The mean price is approximately
proportional to the coinsurance rate in this sample (it is exactly
proportional for the 88 per cent of the observations with no
deductible); as argued in the text, use of the coinsurance rate
results in a lower elasticity estimate than use of actual price
because a change in the coinsurance rate introduced a partially
offsetting change in expenditure.2
The results from these two alternative assumptions are shown in
Table 2-2. As expected, the elasticity using actual expenditure is
much higher than that using the mean price (0.67 vs. 0.16). This
elasticity with respect to expected price compares with an elastic-
ity of approximately 0.2 with respect to the coinsurance rate.
The other results in Table 2-2 are similar to those in Table 2-1,
with the following exceptions: (1) The nonwage income coefficient
is significant when using actual expenditure (asymptotic Z equals
2.26), but the elasticity is still very small (0.07); (2) The education
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TABLE 2-2 LOGIT Estimation of Admission Equation;
Positive Deductibles Includeda
Elasticity at Mean for Absolute Value of
Continuous Variables; Asymptotic Normal
Change in Probability Variable (significance
for Dummy Variables level in parentheses)
Actual Mean Actual Mean
Variable Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Expected price —.67 —.16 5.99 (.01) 1.69(.09)
Physician office visit —.36 —.46 2.00(.04) 2.57 (.01)
coinsurance
Sex .011 .011 1.56 (.12) 1.29 (.20)
Age .25 .26 0.88 (.38)0.97 (.33)
Wage rate 26 28 1.92 (.05) 2.10 (.03)
Nonwage income .064 .040 2.26 (.02) 1.40 (.16)
Health status good .032 .045 3.36 (.01)3.60 (.01)
Health status fair .052 .069 3.63 (.01) 3.76 (.01)
Health status poor .25 28 6.59 (.01) 6.52 (.01)
Family size —.086 —.084 0.43 (.67)0.44 (.66)
Education —.66 —.48 2.02 (.04) 1.52 (.13)
Rural area dummy —.002 —.004 0.36 (.72)0.52 (.60)
Physician-population —.16 —.15 0.68 (.43)0.66 (.51)
Hospital bed-population 25 .28 1.42 (.15) 1.58 (.11)
Race —.011 —.019 1.53 (.12)2.20(.03)
Constant —1.92 —2.38
Chi-square of estimate using actual expenditure (15 d.f.)125.02, p<.000l;
using mean expenditure (15 d.f.) of 82 77, p<0.Ol.
a n=1,761.The sample is the same as for Table 1 plus 182 individuals with positive deductibles who
satisfied the other restrictions.
actual expenditure; (3) The size of the elasticities and the asymp-
totic normal statistics drop somewhat for the hospital bed-popula-
tion ratio. The values are, however, sufficiently similar to those in
Table 2-1 to support the conclusions drawn there.
The results of estimating length of stay, visit, and price equations
are summarized in Table 2-3 and shown in detail in tables 2-4 and
2-5.
Length of Hospital Stay
The own-price elasticities at the mean for length of hospital stay are
estimated to be —0.29 using TSLS and —0.13 using OLS, somewhat
301 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Carea
TABLE 2-3 Own-Price, Cross-Price, and Wage Income
Elasticities, Heads Onlya































































absolute value of tstatisticsare in parentheses. For TSLS, the tstatisticsare the Dhrymes
alternative tstatistics(Dhrymes, 1969). We arrived at the sample used to estimate these equations as
follows. There were 2,376 heads; of these, 788 had insurance that was not verified and 13 had more than
three insurance policies. This latter group was excluded for computational reasons. This left 1,566
heads. This subsample of 1,566 of the national probability sample whose insurance was verified is not
representative by work-group size and income of the entire population. Therefore, we weighted the
sample along these dimensions to be representative of the national population. To obtain the sample of
76 for the length of stay equation we applied the following restrictions to the 1,566 sample (the numbers
in parentheses are the number of 1,566 that the restriction excluded): zero wages or wages greater than
$500 per week (1963 dollars) (475); no hospital days or hospital days exceeding 40 days (1,443);
physician office visit price higher than $50 per visit (1); positive deductible in the hospital policy (92);
expenses exceeding upper limit of policy (3). Some individuals were excluded for more than one
reason. The physician visit equation started with the same 1,566 heads, which were reduced to 563 by
the following restrictions; zero wages or wages greater than $500 per week (1963 dollars) (475);
physician office visit price higher than $50 per visit (1); no physician visits or physician visits exceeding
30 (717); positive deductible in insurance policy applying to physician visits (67). The numbers are

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































larger than the full sample. OLS should be biased away from the cantly diff
TSLS result (Newhouse and Phelps, 1974b), yet the TSLS result is cross-price
larger in absolute value; consequently, we feel that the TSLS result price and i
is likely to be too high, though how much too high is difficult to say. bias away
The cross-price elasticity changes signs between the two estimators have done
and is not significantly different from zero. (Phelps an
Wage income elasticities are negative but are not significant at 1974). Wa
conventional levels. The negative wage income elasticity by itself nonwage I
does not contradict Grossman's investment model because that the sample
model applies to all medical expenditure rather than to any particu- case the e
lar component of medical expenditure. Moreover, in the full sample TSLS.
wage elasticities become positive, as shown in Table 1-3. The visits stea(
negative sign on wage income may also indicate a downward bias also
inincome associated with sickness. Non- weak posi
wage income elasticities are not significant. whites an
As for demographic variables, length of stay increases with age, is
shorter for females, and shorter for married individuals. This is con-
sistent with the effect of these variables taken one at a time in Physician Price
the data gathered by the National Health Survey (Gordon, 1973). The physi
There is no relationship apparent with education nor with self- using the
perceived health status; evidently, self-perceived health status is TSLS rest
too crude to measure differences in health status among the coverage t
hospitalized population. about 30]
seek out 1
Room and Board Price number o.
that bord
The elasticity of room and board price with respect to the coinsur- significan
ance rate is near zero and not significant in both OLS and TSLS. has no e
This is a marked change from our earlier paper. Wage income physician
elasticities are also not significantly different from zero, nor are additional
nonwage income elasticities. As in the case of the full sample, we strong am
infer that neither amenities nor time saved from shorter queues are treat this
very important in explaining the deviation of the room and board must
price, given the type of accommodation. Weighted hospital days are
negatively related to the price; those who are in the hospital longer




It is difficult to estimate demand for physician services from these in prog
data because 85 per cent of this sample had no insurance for 2. Weha
physician services.3 As a result, there is relatively little price
variation. The elasticities using TSLS are small and not signifi- note to
308 Newhouse and Phelps 309
1Picantly different from zero; the OLS elasticities (own-price and
cross-price) are around —0.1 and quite significant. Because both
price and insurance are endogenous, one could argue that there is a
bias away from zero in the OLS results. However, other work we
have done persuades us that this elasticity is at least as high as —0.1
(Phelps and Newhouse, 1972; Newhouse, Phelps, and Schwartz,
1974). Wage income elasticities are small and not significant;
nonwage income is also not significant except for the 5 per cent of
the sample whose nonwage income is higher than $3,000, in which
case the elasticity is 0.07, and quite significant in both OLS and
TSLS. Health status variables are the most closely related to visits;
visits steadily increase as self-perceived health status worsens and
also increase with disability days. Additional physicians show a
weak positive relationship to visits, but beds show none. Non-
whites and females make more visits.
Physician Price
The physician visit price appears quite responsive to coinsurance
using the OLS estimate; the elasticity is and significant. The
TSLS result is of the wrong sign. An increase in insurance from no
coverage to full coverage increases the price per (weighted) visit by
about 30 per cent. Those who visit the physician more frequently
seek out lower-priced physicians; the elasticity with respect to the
number of visits is —0.11 (OLS). Wage income has a positive effect
that borders on significance at usual levels (the effect is very
significant if non-heads are included), whereas nonwage income
has no effect. We interpret this to mean that a higher-priced
physician means less time spent in search or in a queue, and not
additional amenities. The physician-population ratio bears a very
strong and positive relationship to price. We have not attempted to
treat this variable as endogenous, and therefore its interpretation
must remain ambiguous.
1.Ancillary services frequently have different insurance provisions. Work is now
ices from these in progress to estimate their responsiveness to price.
insurance for 2.We have; however, excluded from the sample allindividuals who have
ely little price exceeded an upper limit, on the grounds that we could only imperfectly control
nd not signifi- for health stock loss. This excluded a negligible number of individuals. See
note to Table 1.
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NOTES3.The nine are professional, managerial, sales, foreman, agriculture-mining- 14.Nor isi
construction, manufacturing, finance, public administration, and entertain- different
ment. dE(f(x
4.We are indebted to Karen Davis for this point.
5. We did not feel we had a sufficient degree of overidentification to treat dD
disability days as endogenous. This is i
6.Because our data come from a multistage probability sample (around seventy- zero wh
five primary sampling units), the estimated standard errors are biased down- mums o
ward. The amount of bias depends on the size of covariances within the
-responsi
primary sampling units. On the basis of unpublished analyses of utilization data deductil
within New York City census tracts, we would guess that these covariances are 15.Suppose
sufficiently small so as to create negligible bias in the estimated standard explainii
errors. estimati
7.This is a heroic assumption; it assumes that individuals who are paid by salary degree n
are similar to those paid a wage, as are those who are self-employed. Sick leave 16.Partially
provisions are ignored, as is the possibility that one's opportunity cost of time appears
may fall if one is sick. Nonpecuniary aspects of work are assumed to be a 17.This pro
constant proportion of the money wage. Despite these problems, the simple different
wage rate seems to predict some phenomena reasonably well (most particularly 1974b).
use or nonuse of the medical care system and physician price). (roughly
8.Michael Grossman has pointed out to us that hours of work at any stage in the proportii
life cycle should depend on the rate of interest relative to the rate of time 18.Using th
preference. This implies that age should be in Equation (2), and that if it were, specifica
(2) might become underidentified, because age is strongly related to experi- statistics
ence. The problem can be solved by specifying other variables (such as 19.The pro
industry mix in the area) in (1); because Heckman's procedure failed çomputa- 20.Differen
tionally (see text), we have not pursued this issue. 21.This res
9.The estimator converged to different values depending on the starting point. admissio
10. We also attempted to use the following method for estimating the reservation nonwhit
wage: LetH =a(w _w*) +ea, where H =hours,wandare as defined in Theconi
(1) and (2), and e11 is an error term. Let =bX+er, whereX is the vector of ever, rac.
variables described in the text. Substituting, H =aw + cX + e, where c—ab next.
and e =e11—aer.Therefore, b can be estimated as —c/a andestimated as bX. 22.0.23 =9.
When we followed this procedure, the results were unsatisfactory. Using an equation
OLS estimator to estimate a and c, many of the predicted reservation wages ance rati
were negative. Using a tobit estimator, a different problem arose; the standard 23.Both thi
deviation of the estimated reservation wages seemed unreasonably high (it Was physicia
six times the standard deviation of w). We therefore resorted to the procedure equation
described in the text, one known to be biased, but nevertheless producing 24.There is
estimates that appeared to have less mean square error. We are exploring cient in
alternative estimates of time value. 25.0.18 =1.
11.The total number of individuals in the sample for the equation is larger than in the predi
the utilization equations because individuals with deductibles in their policies , attheir i
havenot been excluded.
12.The proof follows the standard proofs of the level of investment in any risky
asset. The asset with the certain return is preferable.
13.Throughout this discussion we ignore the presence of upper limits. We have
excluded the 0.2 per cent of individuals in our sample who exceeded an upper NOTESTO
limitand have assumed that the behavior of the remainder was not affected by
the presence of an upper limit. Because the probability of exceeding an upper 1.Age and
limit is slight, this assumption should have little effect on our estimates (Keeler, tflorder
Newhouse, and Phelps, 1974), 2.This may
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Thisis proportional to D only if h(D) is constant or, equivalently, if h'(D) is
zero, which will be true only in the special case of local maximums and mini-
mums or a uniform distribution of expected expenditure. As a result, if the
responsiveness to expected price is linear, responsiveness of demand to a
deductible is some nonlinear function.
15.Suppose that higher moments off(x) as well as the first moment are relevant in
explaining demand; policies with no deductibles are more convenient for
estimation in this case also. If D is zero, the momentis homogeneous of
degree n.
16.Partially offsetting, on the assumption that the elasticity is less than 1, as
appears reasonable from our estimates in Section 5.
17.This procedure can lead to biased estimates if the services tend to be covered at
different rates and one is used without the other (Newhouse and Phelps,
1974b). However, these two services are covered at nearly identical rates
(roughly 0.3), and the quantities of services consumed are probably roughly in
proportion.
18.Using the instrumental variable estimate of C, the elasticity at the mean for the
specification used in Table 2 was on the order of —0.4; asymptotic normal
statistics were slightly in excess of 1.
19.The program uses a Fletcher-Powell minimization algorithm. —
20.Differentiating (4), one can compute that the elasticity at the mean is (1—P)f3x.
21.This result can be approximated by assuming that whites have the mean
admission rate and length of stay (0.078 and 7.39 days, respectively), whereas
nonwhites are similar to whites except for the racial dummy variable effect.
The conclusion ignores effects of race on the price per weighted day, if any; how-
ever, race is not significantly different from zero in price equation presented
next.
22.0.23 =9.24/40.97.The 9.24 is the coefficient in the OLS room and board price
equation; the 40.97 value is the predicted room and board price at a coinsur-
ance rate of 1.
23.Both this equation and the physician visit price equation were run without the
physician-population and bed-population ratios to guard against a simultaneous
equation problem. The estimated coefficients were virtually unchanged.
24.There is a positive but essentially zero (and insignificant) cross-price coeffi-
cient in the OLS length of stay equations.
25.0.18 =1.27/6.93.The 1.27 figure is the coefficient in the price equation; 6.93 is
the predicted price selected by an individual with no insurance (other variables
at their means).
NOTESTO APPENDIX 2
1.Age and education are not entered in interval form in the logit equations
in order to minimize computational costs.
2.This may not be true of a change in a deductible. All those hospitalized in our
311 Price and Income Elast;cjties of Medical Caresample exceeded the deductible in their policies. A small change in the
_____
and deductible, therefore, would not affect the marginal conditions. Health
3.This may explain the near zero cross-price elasticity in estimating cross-price in
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Newhouse and Phelps have made a valuable contribution to the literature on
econometric analysis of the demand for medical care. Their work is careful
and detailed. They pay ample attention both to rigorous use of economic
theory to derive hypotheses and to the relevance of the specification to major
policy considerations. Although by no means the first econometric study of
this topic,itis distinctive in a number of important ways. First, data on
individuals are used instead of data on families or data aggregated by state.
Compared to aggregate data, Newhousé and Phelps' data have the advan-
tage of avoiding general aggregation problems (discussed by Theil and
others), and provide superior opportunities for accurately specifying price.
However, with data on individuals, a change in the price faced by a single
individual should have different effects from an across-the-board change for
all individuals in an area as community norms of health care change. National
health insurance may approximate the latter model (change in utilization
through norms) more closely.
A second distinct aspect of this work is specification of a particularly
accurate marginal coinsurance rate. This is accomplished through informa-
tion on the benefit structure of individual insurance policies and by eliminat-
ing individuals with deductibles from the sample. Other studies have used the
average coinsurance rate to calculate net price. This method is theoretically
313 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical CareI
defective because deductibles cause net price to be underestimated for low These findii
expenditures and overestimated for high expenditures, which causes an physician s
upward bias in price elasticity estimates. Another problem with the average inpatient
rate is that it is a function of the dependent variable, giving rise to a bias in the swamped b
opposite direction. Unfortunately, the overall direction of bias is not clear. A Estimatin
third difference from other studies is treatment of insurance as endogenous. income anc
Sicker people allegedly buy more extensive insurance coverage. Although interactions.
this is not a problem for studies using aggregate data, adverse selection elasticities
among individuals could give rise to an upward bias in price elasticity als who are
estimates. TSLS estimation is used here. Exogenous variables in the insur- indication tl
ance equation that are excluded from the demand for care equation are size of Although
the employee group and a series of occupational dummies. A fourth differ- analysis an
ence from other studies is the inclusion of health status variables in the mentioning.
demand equations. Their inclusion substantially improves the fitin many sample in
equations and avoids potential specification bias resulting from their omis- example, a
sian. A fifth distinct aspect of this study is estimation of equations for price because of
paid. The authors see differences from the mean in price paid to reflect put back.)
variation in amenities, queuing, and degree of search. Finally, Grossman's because of
model of the demand for health care as a human capital investment decision the same re
is used as the theoretical basis for this work. Although the theory does not dropped.
suggest inclusion of any new variables, some ambiguity with respect to Although
predicted signs is removed. Wage rate, nonwage income, education, and soarenotd
family size are the principal variables affected. the populat
The elasticity of expenditures with respect to price are estimated to be stantially th
—0.33 for hospital care and —0.22 for physician services. These estimates, price elasti
particularly the physician estimates, are lower than those reported by other errors from
researchers. (The equations are linear, so elasticityis evaluated at the Dropping
mean.It should be pointed out that mean coinsurance rates are 0.27 for estimates t
hospital care and 0.85 for physician services.) for medica
A number of aspects of these results warrant detailed discussion. First, premium d
TSLS estimates were uniformly poor. Elasticities were often insignificant, and Excluding
ifnot, they tended to be higher than OLS estimates, contrary to a priori the bias in
expectations. Certain implications can be drawn from this result. Adverse deductible
selection probably is not so quantitatively important as had been thought, desirable to
which is plausible considering the large proportion of insurance that is marginal c
purchased by employers. In fact, the sick may have less insurance rather than dividuals fa
more, for they tend to be unemployed or employed by companies without to imputei
health insurance benefits, thus facing a higher loading charge. In empirical challenge,
analysis of aggregate data, Frech has found adverse selection to be quantita- health insur
tively small. The equa
Another implication of these results is that the TSLS estimation is not very valuable an
efficient in this context. Since other researchers are unlikely to be able to
' aggregated
estimate a superior demand for insurance equation to obtain an instrument for average pri
insurance coverage, treating insurance as endogenous isnot a fruitful price over
endeavor, adequate j(
A highly interesting series of results are the negative cross-elasticities ences in wa
obtained, implying that hospital and physician services are complements.
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These findings run counter to the usual notion of absence of coverage of
physician services causing outpatient services to be performed on an
inpatient basis. Although this may be the case, this effect is apparently
swamped by other cross-price relationships.
Estimating interactions between the price variables on the one hand and
income and health status on the other did not turn up any significant
interactions. This resultis contrary to a general expectation that price
elasticities might be higher for low-income individuals and lower for individu-
als who are ill. However, the authors do not consider their evidence as a firm
indication that such interactions do not exist.
AlthoughI am generally enthusiastic about both the competence of the
analysis and the usefulness of the results, Ihave a few criticisms worth
mentioning. The authors have been rather ruthless in cutting down their
sample in the interest of avoiding errors in the independent variables. For
example,allpersons other than heads of households were eliminated
because of difficulties in establishing a value for their time. (They later were
put back.) Those with insurance policies with deductibles were dropped
because of difficulties in assigning them a marginal coinsurance rate. For
the same reason, those individuals exceeding the limit of their policy were
dropped.
Although the reasons for reducing the sample are valid, the costs of doing
so are not discussed. By focusing only on heads of households, a large part of
the population with potentially different behavior is ignored, reducing sub-
stantially the efficiency in estimation, Apparently, as seen in the later results,
price elasticities for heads were not different, but the increase in standard
errors from reducing the sample was large.
Dropping those individuals with deductibles and limits may cause the
estimates to be inconsistent. It is rational for those with high price elasticities
for medical care to purchase insurance with large deductiblesiftheir
premium depends on use (as in the case of a group of similar individuals).
Excluding those choosing deductibles could affect the estimates, although
the bias in this sample is limited by the small number of individuals who have
deductible provisions in their policies. To maintain consistency, it might be
desirable to also drop all of those approaching the limits of their policy as the
marginal coinsurance rate is exceeded by the implicit rate that those in-
dividuals face. It may be best not to eliminate either group, but to attempt
to impute implicit coinsurance rates to all. Although this will be quite a
challenge, the preponderance of deductibles in recent proposals for national
health insurance makes such an analysis highly relevant.
The equations using price paid as dependent variables are potentially very
valuable and are much easier to estimate with data on individuals than with
aggregated data. The efficiency of estimation could be improved if the
average price in the respondent's community was used instead of the average
price over the entire sample. Three regional dummy variables do not do an
adequate job of reflecting varying degrees of local monopoly power, differ-
ences in wage levels and construction costs, and price differences caused by
immobilities of medical resources. Consequently, a great deal of variation in
315 IPrice and Income Elasticities of Medical Carethe deviation from average pricesisattributable to factors other than
welfare loss amenities, queuing, and search activity—the factors that the deviations are the benefits
supposed to reflect. Since sampling is concentrated in a limited number of price elasti
primary sampling units, there may be enough data to obtain prices from the financing p1
sample for each area. If not, outside price data should be brought in.
Because of the unique position of the physician as an agent for the patient
as well as provider of health care, and the evidence that health care markets
tend to stay out of equilibrium for long periods of time, supply variables have
been included in most economists' estimates of the demand for health care.
When individual observations are used, however, variables reflecting de-
mand for care in the community should be included along with the supply Harold S.
variables. For instance, an area may have a large number of hospital beds per Stanford
capita, but if the population is old and has extensive insurance coverage, the
survey respondent may be facing a market in which there is excess demand This most ri
rather than excess supply. Thus, omitting community demand variables risks one positiv
losing some of the information that the supply variables are intended to usefulness
provide, analysis of
The authors use type of accomodation to adjust hospital length of stay for should be
productivity in health care. This variable strikes me more as a reflection of remember
amenities than productivity in delivering health care. To the extent that require mu
productivity is not adjusted for in the length of stay equation, there should be a The use
downward bias in the price elasticity estimate. However, productivity will
.
wind up in the price of care equation, giving an upward bias to price elasticity
in that equation. The net effect when price elasticity of expenditures is and for whi
computed should be zero. The problem does not affect the physician service improveme
equation so severely, because the price differences between G.P.'s and insurance
specialists are much better indicators of productivity difference, and deduc.
Since this study clearly adds to our knowledge about medical care function to
demand, it is appropriate to ask where we should go from here. There are a an implici
number of directions that I can see. One, which is suggested by Newhouse and microdata
Phelps, is studying the demand for ancillary services in the hospital. Feld-
0 care to be
stems calculations of changes in hospital costs over time show that increases allows dat
in inputs per patient day are a significant cause of costinflation. In his theory, Phelps we
increase is predominantly demand-determined. This makes the study of variables,
demand for ancillary services particularly important. counties fr
Use of health status variables is an endeavor of great potential. Although There ar
Newhouse and Phelps characterize their variables as crude, they contribute the use of
to the explanatory power of a number of equations. The usefulness of health equation ai
status variables is pointed out by some of the results that Karen Davis
, of observa
presented in her paper at this conference. With health status variables posed of e
included, utilization was a positive function of income. With the variables observatioi
omitted, the relationship was U-shaped. based on
Finally, more work on the interactions between price and health status, these
income, age, and other variables is desirable. National health insurance is that a
often advocated not only to correct alleged market failure in private health that may, ii
insurance, but also to subsidize medical care for certain groups such as the the proport
poor and the sick to increase their use. All plans involve a tradeoff between and only 4





n prices from the
)rought in.
ent for the patient
aith care markets
ly variables have








length of stay for
as a reflection of
o the extent that












tion. In his theory,










roups such as the
tradeoff between
L
welfare losses from financing the plan and moral hazard on the one hand and
the benefits of increased utilization by target groups on the other. Detailed
price elasticity information is needed to both assess and design public
financing plans with these considerations in mind.
Harold S. Luft
Stanford University
This most recent paper by Newhouse and Phelps is important for two reasons,
one positive and one negative. On the positive side,it demonstrates the
usefulness of microdata sets and the potential for much more detailed
analysis of the demand for medical care services. On the negative side, we
should be wary of too much concentration on the question of demand and
remember that the market for medical care has unique characteristics that
require much more study of the supply conditions.
The use of micro survey data by Newhouse and Phelps has several real
advantages. They are able to move beyond data based on geographical
aggregates for which we have little knowledge of the underlying distributions
and for which mean values may be inappropriate. A primary example of the
improvement afforded by microdataisthe very detailed description of
insurance coverage available in the NORC data. This allows the coinsurance
and deductible provisions in the policies to be separated and a demand
function to be estimated in which the price is truly the marginal price and not
an implicit average price based on gross and net expenditures. These
microdata also allow the specific decisions concerning the marginal unit of
care to be more clearly identified. In addition, the use of a household survey
allows data on individual health status to be incorporated. Newhouse and
Phelps were also able to include some estimates of geographically based
variables, such as the supply of physicians and beds per capita for the
counties from which the sample was drawn.
There are, however, a number of problems and cautions that are raised by
the use of microdata. The need for using the appropriate sample for each
equation and the problem of missing data can lead to widely varying numbers
of observations. For instance, the final hospital elasticity results are com-
posed of estimates for length of stay (364 observations), admissions (1,579
observations), and price (313 observations). Other related regressions are
based on samples ranging from 76 to 4,536. Although even the smallest of
these samples is reasonably large for aggregate series, one must be careful
that a variable does not represent only a very small number of observations
that may, in the particular sample used, be aberrant. For instance, based on
the proportions found in the total sample, only 7 of the 76 people are black
and only 4 of 76 have nonwage incomes in excess of $3,000.
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IPrice and Income Elasticities of Medical CareWhen working with aggregate data, ignorance usually leads us to assume in the East,
that all variables are equally reliable or unreliable. (Discussion of the effects availability
of errors in measurement can usually be traced to coefficients that appear The final
with thewrong' sign or magnitude.) Concern about the measurement of marginal da
variables is probably more important for microdata sets in which errors are primarily on
less likely to average out in aggregation, and the mere number of observa- ancillary se
tions makes looking at the residuals a particularly painful task. In fact, one of additional o
the reasons for the Newhouse-Phelps paper was to correct an error in hospital, ho
the algorithm that generated the wage variable in their original paper. informal pre
Finally, there are some statistical problems that should be recognized. The When exa
NORC sample is clustered; this invalidates the assumptions of independence guishfourty
of observations and leads to standard error estimates that are biased preventive"-
downward. This bias should be considered when reporting the results. The and (4) phys
clustering also implies that the data for some variables, such as the is relatively
physician-population ratios, are based on the number of clusters in the the visits of
sample, not the number of persons. may riot be
On the negative side, and more important than the use of microdata, is the consumer's
use of such data in the context of a very traditional market framework. There proportion
are a number of characteristics of the medical care sector that should cause probably no
us to focus at least some of our attention on the behavior of the physician however, in
rather than solely on the rational consumer making choices among a number probably m
of commodities. The pathbreaking article by Kenneth Arrow on 'Uncertainty preventive v
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care' clearly indicated the importance category. E
of uncertainty and the asymmetry of information in medical care.2 In a recent check-ups
review of the econometric literature, Martin Feldstein argues persuasively that visits.
it is inappropriate to either ignore the physician or assume that utilization is Physician
determined solely by the physician.3 Instead, he proposes that future research investments,
consider the physician to be an agent for the consumer and then examine the anxiety. Net
behavior of the physician when this relationship is not perfect. but other ta
Newhouse and Phelps should continue their analysis with this model and provider sh
further disaggregate the decision process. For instance, the total utilization of visits compr
hospital care is appropriately broken down into the decision to admit, the of visits mo
length of stay, and the level of services consumed. The admission equation through the
should utilize the expected net price of the episode, including all hospital suggestion
services, (not just the room charge) arid the net price of physicians' services other
in the hospital. To test the impact of physicians on the demand curve, it may curve.
be appropriate to include a measure of the marginal profit to the physician The Newl
resulting from the admission decision. (Under fee-for-service, this will be are intended
positive and related to gross physician charges; under prepaid plans the and with stil
marginal profit is zero or negative.Itis also likely to vary substantially for medical car
surgical and medical procedures.)
After the decision to undergo hospitalization, it is important to examine the
determinants of theintensity of services" or the cost per patient day. Again,
net price to the patient and marginal profit to the decision makers are often
thought to be completely based on technical considerations and are probably NOTES
those in which the patient is least competent.4 Intensity is often a function of IFor estimat
the availability of special services in the hospital and standard practices in Repiicaiion
the area. For instance, costs per day in the West are consistently higher than iember 197
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tently higher than
in the East, but this is probably because of shorter lengths of stay. Long-run
availability of services and practice patterns should also be investigated.
The final hospitalization decisions concern the length of stay. For the
marginal day in the hospital, the net price of hospital services will be based
primarily on the room charge and coinsurance rate; there are generally few
ancillary services. The physician is also likely to gain little relative to an
additional office visit, and especially little relative to major surgical fees. (The
hospital, however, tends to make money on the marginal day and may exert
informal pressures on the physician.)
When examining the utilization of physician visits it is important to distin-
guish four types: (1)those required for employment, insurance, etc.; (2)"purely
preventive"—patient initiated; (3) response to symptoms—patient initiated;
and (4) physician-suggested follow-up with patient compliance. The first type
is relatively uninteresting although it may account for a substantial fraction of
the visits of certain population subgroups. Even the purely preventive visit
may not be completely patient initiated because the physician can alter the
consumer's perception of the benefits of such care. For instance, the
proportion of women who think that yearly Pap smears are necessary is
probably not independent of the supply of gynecologists in the area.Itis,
however, in the area of preventive care that Grossman's investment model is
probably most applicable.5 There is also some question about whether
preventive visits should be considered in the investment or the consumption
category. Education is consistently one of the most important predictors of
check-ups but there is little medical evidence to support the value of such
visits.
Physician visitsin response to symptoms may be viewed inpart as
investments, but they are largely "consumption" services to reduce pain and
anxiety. Net price, search, and time costs are probably of primary importance,
but other factors influencing symptom recognition and choice of the type of
provider should also be investigated. Finally, physician-suggested follow-up
visits comprise a substantial fraction of total visits and are probably the group
of visits most subject to provider influence. This influence occurs not just
through the statement that the patient should return for a follow-up. This
suggestion can be made with varying degrees of force and, in the absence of
other specialized information, is likely to shift the location of the demand
curve.
The Newhouse-Phelps paper is a valuable contribution; these comments
are intended to suggest that further research needs to be done with microdata
and with still more disaggregated, and perhaps more realistic, models of the
medical care market.
NOTES
1.For estimates of the magnitude of this bias see Leslie Kish and Martin Frankel, 'Balanced
Replications for Standard Errors," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 65 (Sep-
tember 1970), pp. 1071—1094.
319 Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Care2.American Economic Review, 53 (December 1963), pp. 941—973.
3."Economic Studies of Health Economics' in M. Intriligator (editor), Frontiers of Quantitative
Economics, II (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1974).
4.The potential consumer may be willing to pay a substantial premium beyond actuarial value so
that he or she is sure to face a very low price (coinsurance rate) when decisions must be made
that directly affect his or her health. Moral hazard may be a positive good for the consumer.
5.The testing of such a model is very difficult. For instance, positive coefficients for wage income
are predicted by the model and are found by Newhouse and Phelps. One might predict the
same findings on the basis of the sliding scale of fees that is more closely related to what KA the physician thinks the patient earns than total income including unearned income. The sliding
scale has become less important in the last ten years, so that a comparison of the Newhouse- S L() Phelps results and more recent data should help to answerthis question. See Michael Grossman,
"On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health," Journal of Political Economy, University of Floric
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